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Introduction 
In everyday life, the most important questions we face tend to be normative ones 
about what is good or bad, right or wrong. Because of our psychological and physical 
vulnerability, our dependence on others, and our capacity for diverse actions, our 
relation to the world is one of concern, for we can flourish or suffer. We are 
necessarily evaluative beings, continually having to monitor and evaluate how we, 
and other things we care about, are faring, often wondering ‘what to do for the best’, 
whether it is about our health, our actions, our environment or our relations with 
others. Some of this evaluation is done ‘on automatic’, semi-consciously, in the flow 
of life, but some involves reflection or ‘internal conversations’ (Archer, 2003). 
Evaluation is central to the work of professionals such as social workers, who 
continually assess the well-being and safety or otherwise of clients, and decide what 
they need and what would improve their situation.  
But in social science it is positive (descriptive and explanatory) questions that are 
primary, and indeed normative judgements are widely seen as radically different, and 
in danger of compromising the objectivity of research. The orthodox position is that 
facts and value are sharply distinct, values cannot be derived from facts, and it is not 
the job of social science to make value judgements. And even though social science 
                                                             
1 This chapters draws extensively on my book Why Things Matter to People (Sayer, 2011). 
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generally recognizes that values and valuation pervade the worlds of those they study, 
its treatment of people’s relation to the world of concern often fails to do justice to it. 
Typically, it either reduces their behaviour to the following of conventions or norms, 
or it treats values as merely subjective, and not about anything objective. People’s 
values and evaluations are seen as just facts about them, not beliefs and claims that 
have import or significance and could be more or less true. The result is an alienated 
and alienating representation of social life that fails to acknowledge the force of 
people’s concerns and evaluations. And if a social scientific account of a situation 
fails to tell us whether people are flourishing or suffering – because its authors believe 
they must not make value-judgements in their work – the account will inevitably be 
deficient as a description.  
The inadequacy of these treatments of normativity is evident in many everyday 
situations. When a social worker says a child is being abused, this clearly involves not 
only an evaluative judgement that the situation is bad, but a factual claim about what 
is the case; she is not merely arbitrarily projecting a value-judgement onto the world 
or just following a convention or norm. It straddles any distinction of fact and value. 
And on the basis of what she believes to fact, the social worker has to decide what 
action should be taken; she appears to derive an ought from an is. And of course in 
life generally, we continually have to make judgements about situations and decide 
what to do.  
In this chapter, I shall argue that if social science is to understand both everyday life 
and the work of professionals, it needs to overcome its resistance to normativity, both 
as part of its object of study and within its own practice or discourse. If it is to 
understand people and their world, it needs to take the normative dimension of life 
seriously, both in terms of how and why things matter to people, and recognize that 
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evaluative judgements may be more or less true. This involves challenging the 
pervasive assumption that positive and normative thought, or fact and value, are 
always radically distinct and incompatible. While it involves some arguments from 
critical realism, the argument also draws upon literature from neo-Aristotelian ethics 
and the ethic of care. I shall first argue that social science’s dominant understanding 
of the nature of values is flawed, and that its dichotomous treatments of fact and value 
are unsustainable where issues of health or flourishing or suffering concerned. I shall 
then discuss whether some valuations - for example, about well-being – might have 
universal applicability or whether all such judgements are culturally-specific. Next I 
argue that acting ethically requires attentiveness to the specificities of the other and 
their context, and go on to illustrate this in relation to care and dignity. Penultimately, 
I discuss and critique poststructuralism’s own difficulties with normativity, before 
concluding. 
 
Social science and values 
In so far as social science deals with normativity, it tends to treat people’s sentiments, 
concerns and judgements just as contingent facts about them and their societies. Their 
values are either just subjective, individual preferences (‘emotivism’2) or internalized 
social norms (‘conventionalism’). In neither case are they seen as rational or as 
responses to objective states of affairs, such as practices of kindness or cruelty. In 
conventionalism, values are merely arbitrary cultural conventions – ‘what people do 
                                                             
2 “Emotivism2 is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments 
are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral 
or evaluative in character . . . [they] are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral judgment is not 
to be secured by any rational method, for there are none. . . We use moral judgments not only to 
express our own feelings or attitudes, but also precisely to produce such effects in others.” (MacIntyre, 
1985, p.11-12).  As we shall see, the term is unfortunate in that it suggests emotions have nothing to do 
with reason. 
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round here’ – or in a more recent version, merely ‘culturally constituted’. As 
Davydova and Sharrock note, this implies a ‘conformity concept of morality’ 
(Davydova and Sharrock, 2003; see also Bauman, 1989). Consequently, it can render 
people as socially-constructed dupes - objects of a superior sociological gaze. In both 
emotivist and conventionalist interpretations, the normative force of individuals’ 
concerns and valuations - how and why they matter to actors – is lost, edited out, as if 
it were either unimportant or too obvious to require comment.  
But both approaches seem at least half right. Values are subjective in the sense that 
they are important elements of individuals’ characters and beliefs; they may be shared 
with others, but they are also felt personally. And conventionalism acknowledges that 
values vary significantly across societies, and that individuals tend to take on the 
values of their own culture. Yet while values are indeed culturally variable, they are 
not completely arbitrary; they have something to do with well-being and ill-being and 
they refer to something which is not merely their product. When those who are 
subjectivists or conventionalists in the seminar room experience bad treatment by 
someone in their everyday lives, they are unlikely to remonstrate with the perpetrator 
by saying ‘look, personally, I just don’t happen to like that’, or ‘don’t you know that’s 
culturally constructed as bad round here?’; rather they are likely to draw attention in 
some way to the harm and suffering that has been caused. This implies that values are 
not just conventions about what we should do and think but about matters to do with 
well-being, where well-being is not simply anything we care to define it as or just an 
experience, but a state which can exist even if it is not noticed, and which we can try 
to understand, or construct if it has not been achieved. To refer to harm is to identify 
objective consequences. To be sure, our sensitivity to and awareness of harm is 
mediated by available ways of seeing and convention, and our beliefs about harm are 
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fallible, but that fallibility presupposes there is something objective in the sense of 
independent of our beliefs about which we can be mistaken (Collier, 2003). At the 
same time, if we could never successfully identify harm, we wouldn’t survive for 
long. We tell our children to be careful when crossing the road not because in our 
culture it is constructed as dangerous, but because it is dangerous whatever our 
culture, and the costs of our fallibility in making judgements about it are extremely 
high.  
In other words, our values and value-judgements, particularly those concerning how 
people relate to one another, have a eudaimonistic content, to use Aristotle’s term: 
that is, they involve an assessment of flourishing or its absence. Many social norms 
are based upon beliefs about what constitutes human flourishing, though some appear 
to be no more than arbitrary conventions. As Shaun Nichols shows, research on how 
people make ethical judgements shows them to be capable of distinguishing 
eudaimonistic moral norms or values from conventional or authority-based norms. He 
reports an interesting study by Nucci of Amish children in the United States in which 
it was found that 100% of them “said that if God had made no rule against working on 
Sunday, it would not be wrong to work on Sunday. However, more than 80% of these 
subjects said that even if God had made no rule about hitting, it would still be wrong 
to hit.” (Nichols, 2004, p. 6). Other studies of children have shown them to be able to 
distinguish the moral from the merely conventional by their third birthday (Nichols, 
2004, p.78). Interestingly, studies of psychopaths have shown them to be incapable of 
distinguishing the moral from the conventional, since they think of all wrongdoing in 
terms of the transgression of norms. By contrast, non-psychopathic criminals are able 
to appreciate that their actions were wrong not merely because they transgressed 
norms or conventions, but because they harmed others (Nichols, 2004, p.76). How 
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interesting too that some sociologists should support the idea that actions are only 
wrong because they are socially defined as wrong!3 Sociologists may sometimes cite 
actors’ moral terms in inverted commas to indicate that they are not endorsing the 
judgements those terms imply, but it is a mistake to allow this methodological device 
to become an ontological assumption that they are just conventions rather than 
judgements about suffering or well-being (Davydova and Sharrock, 2004). 
To understand normativity in life we need a conception of people which sees them as 
capable but vulnerable sentient beings, having needs and wants that are in continual 
need of replenishment or development. We are always poised between existing mixes 
of lack, suffering and flourishing and possible future ones, and always in varying 
degrees aware of our situation and concerned about it. This implies what might, for 
want of a better term, be called a ‘needs-based conception of social being’ and action, 
viewing actors not only as causal agents and as self-interpreting meaning makers, but 
as needy, desiring beings, dependent on others, having an orientation to the world of 
care and concern4, and capable of flourishing or suffering. ‘Needs’ here is used as a 
shorthand that also covers lack, wants and desire.5 While some have mainly 
physiological origins, others might be termed ‘culturally-acquired or emergent needs’ 
deriving from involvement in and commitment to cultural practices, such as the need 
of the religious to worship.  
                                                             
3 This subjectivist view of values goes back 2,300 years to Epicurus, and is reproduced in Durkheim’s 
claim that ‘actions are evil because they are socially prohibited, rather than socially prohibited because 
they are evil.’ (Bauman, 1989, p.173). 
4 There are some similarities here with Heidegger’s emphasis on care in Being and Time (Heidegger, 
1962). 
5 Needs, lack and desire cannot be assimilated comfortably just to critical realism’s concepts of causal 
powers and liabilities, for these are not simply powers to do or suffer change, rather they imply 
impulses or drives to remove the deficiencies they represent. Although following Bhaskar’s later work, 
some critical realists may want to use the concept of ‘absence’ here (Bhaskar, 1993), in my view this 
effectively invents a concept (in non-realist fashion) as a substitute for identifying the mechanisms that 
produce and satisfy needs. 
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There are some common sources of reluctance to embrace such a conception. One is 
the fear – often driven by sociological imperialism - that acknowledging needs, drives 
and the like implies essentialism, biologism and psychologism.6 Yet a reference to 
needs and the like does not have to imply that they are reducible to inborn bodily or 
psychological requirements, for although we are born with some basic needs, even 
these are quickly socially-cultivated and developed, and culturally interpreted and 
mediated. Contrary to a common misconception in much philosophy and social 
science, including post-structuralism, nature is not immutable.  Consequently, to 
acknowledge that we have biological causal powers and liabilities is not to submit to 
biological determinism, for as with any living being, our interactions with our 
environment can modify as well as reproduce those powers. In particular, 
neuroplasticity means that our brains are continually being reshaped by our 
experiences, though at any moment, just how they are affected by them depends on 
what our brains currently allow. So we can reject a cultural determinism that treats 
people’s characteristics as having nothing to do with their biology. Needs, lack and 
vulnerability presuppose not determinism but the openness of the world, for there is 
always the possibility of failure to satisfy, fulfil or endure. In critical realist terms, we 
live in open systems, whose future is not predetermined. Moreover, although lack is 
inescapable, we can to some extent shape what form our needs and desires take, 
though wishful thinking has limits. Nor does acknowledging biological powers and 
liabilities entail a homogenisation of human needs and wants, for each of us is 
different and we are capable of a vast range of forms of life. Further, as we noted, 
many needs and wants are effectively culturally autonomous and irreducible, though 
                                                             
6 On essentialism and anti-essentialism, see O’Neill (1994) and Sayer (2000a). 
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these too presuppose a capacity for acculturation not possessed by many other 
species.  
The treatment of meaning within the needs-based approach goes beyond that of 
hermeneutic approaches in that it deals not only with signifiers and the signified, and 
shared understandings, but significance or import. This is what people refer to when 
they talk about ‘what something means to them’, such as what their friends mean to 
them or what it means to be an immigrant (Sayer, 2006). In such cases, they are not 
giving a definition of those things, but an indication of their import or significance for 
them, how they value them, how such things impact on their well-being or something 
else that they care about (Taylor, 1985). The relationship to the world that is implied 
is one of care or concern and valuation, in which things are assessed for their 
implications for well-being, however defined. Here, emotions, understood not only as 
‘affect’ but as embodied commentaries on our well-being and concerns, are 
fundamental to understanding what makes us care about and want to do anything, and 
what makes anything matter (Archer, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001). An ethnographic study 
might explain, in a matter-of-fact way, how the members of a certain group 
understand and act towards each other in terms of meanings primarily as conventions 
or shared interpretations, but give little indication of just why some things have 
particular import or significance for them, that is how they affect things they care 
about.7  
Describing ‘what something means to me’ cannot reasonably be glossed merely as 
subjective; the evaluations and feelings are about something, including the well-being 
or ill-being of actors, and perhaps the fortunes of particular practices and institutions. 
                                                             
7 Renato Rosaldo has noted this tendency in anthropology (Rosaldo, 1989). 
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We also assume that those subjective beliefs and feelings that we and others have are 
objective in the sense that they do exist. While they tell us something about the 
valuer, they are justified (or not) by reference to claims about the nature of their 
objects, and thus are descriptive as well as evaluative. Any account of social practices 
which gives no indication of their implications for well-being, if only in terms of 
correcting a misapprehension, invites responses like ‘so what?’, ‘what’s your point?’ 
The editing out of significance, perhaps because it is felt to be ‘unscientific’, is a 
central cause of the alienated character of so much contemporary social science.  
 
Beyond the fact-value dichotomy 
Social science’s difficulties in understanding the normative dimension of social life 
derive from the influence of certain philosophical ideas about facts and values. These 
include: 1) that facts and values are radically distinct such that while factual claims 
can be true or false, value judgements about what is good or bad cannot; and 2) that 
value judgements about what is good or bad or what we ought to do, cannot be 
derived from facts. Although these ideas are actually contested in philosophy (e.g. 
Putnam, 2002; Taylor, 1967, Williams, 1985), few social scientists realise this, and so 
they are allowed an extraordinary privilege. 
Under the influence of these claims, social scientists are traditionally taught to 
distinguish sharply between fact and value; the belief that this can and must be done 
tends to become deeply engrained. While researchers can study values, they are 
generally taught that they must try to minimise the effect of their own values in their 
accounts, and to abstain from value-judgements, so that they can be objective. 
Radicals tend to oppose this by inverting it: they say that no-one can be value-free, so 
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they won’t pretend to be objective. Yet of course, they don’t just make up their 
research results and they clearly believe their accounts to be more true than those they 
reject. The problem here is that both conservatives and their radical opponents agree 
that objectivity and value-judgements cannot go together. 
We can begin to see what is wrong with this assumption by going back to the example 
of the social worker’s claim that ‘this child is being abused’. This is a truth claim - a 
fallible claim about a state of affairs that is objective in the sense of capable of 
existing regardless of whether it is observed or understood by anyone. Indeed, as 
critical realists argue, it’s precisely because of this independence of many states of 
affairs from their being observed by someone that makes knowledge of them fallible 
(Collier, 2003). The claim is based on a judgement, and in that sense is ‘subjective’, 
but this doesn’t mean it cannot also be more or less ‘objective’ in the different sense 
of ‘true’. The social worker obviously has values, and is aware of certain norms about 
how children should be treated. But those norms aren’t merely arbitrary conventions; 
they are based on judgements about flourishing and suffering, and what is good or bad 
for children. So is the social worker’s claim a factual one or a value-judgement, or 
both? 
When we talk about people and their actions, we often use words which seem to 
combine fact and value, description and evaluation; we describe them as kind, cruel, 
courageous, generous, selfish, humiliating, racist, abusive, oppressive, and so on. 
These are ‘thick ethical descriptions’. If you don’t know that humiliation or cruelty 
are bad, then you don’t know what they are; the descriptive and evaluative 
components can’t be separated. Thus, when we decide to accept a description of some 
practice, say, as ‘abusive’ or ‘racist’, we simultaneously accept the implicit valuation. 
By comparison, thin ethical concepts such as ‘good’,’ bad’, ‘duty’, ‘virtue’, 
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‘obligation’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ -  “empty moral words”, as Iris Murdoch called them 
- can seem more like arbitrary assertions than reasonable descriptions and evaluations 
(Murdoch, 1970, p. 40). This is precisely because as abstractions and summarising 
terms, thin ethical terms are removed from the range of concrete situations and 
behaviours to which they might be applied and in terms of which they can be justified 
(Putnam, 2002, p.60). And it is this abstraction from concrete aspects of life which 
lends credence to the idea that all evaluative claims are radically distinct from factual 
claims. Yet where issues of well-being are concerned, we encounter a middle ground 
between fact and value. 
Part of the problem here is a common misunderstanding of ‘values’ that reduces them 
to purely subjective phenomena, ignoring the fact that they are about things that can 
exist largely independently of them. It is clearer in the case of ‘valuation’ and 
‘evaluation’, that these have objects, referents. It is easier to overlook the referents of 
values than those of specific evaluations, because values are more abstract – they are 
sedimented valuations that have become attitudes or dispositions, and which 
recursively inform particular evaluations or judgements we make on specific 
occasions. Sometimes we are scarcely aware of some of our values, but they influence 
particular evaluations that we make of events. Although our values tend to be deeply 
embrained or embodied, they can be changed. For example, it is possible for our 
negative values about a certain kind of person to be challenged if they behave in ways 
that we did not expect of them, generating cognitive dissonance. Particularly if the 
experience is repeated, our values may change, though habits of thought can take a 
long time to revise. Hence, though they are often difficult to argue about, values are 
not beyond reason. Typically, when we reason about them we do so by reference to 
the actions and circumstances to which they refer, for example, by pointing to 
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problems that are produced by a certain kind of behaviour, such as those associated 
with drug dependency.  
When we turn to the idea that values cannot be derived from facts, usually referred to 
as the ‘is - ought problem’, we immediately notice that this middle ground is missing: 
evaluation - which spans both description and evaluation - is ignored and normativity 
is reduced to imperative direction – ‘should’, ‘ought’. It is then argued that values 
cannot be logically derived from facts, and that social scientists should not attempt to 
derive any normative conclusions from empirical research. For example, from the fact 
that, someone has no home, it doesn’t logically (i.e. deductively) follow that they 
should have one. But deductive logic is highly demanding and in not only everyday 
life but in science we make inferences that are not arrived at through deduction. 
Indeed, it is bizarre to insist on such a demanding criterion for inferring what to do. 
Imagine going to the doctor to have your blood pressure taken. She does so and gives 
you two numbers, one over the other. You say “is that good or bad? What should I do 
about it?” Imagine if the doctor answered “well, I can’t tell you because that would be 
a value judgement and it would compromise my objectivity, and I can’t advise you 
what to do because you can’t derive an ought from an is.”  
This shows the absurdity of dichotomising fact and value in such cases, and of 
assuming that the only inferences that we can rely on are deductive ones. The fact that 
ought does not follow deductively from is, is purely of academic interest. Logic is 
about the relation between statements, not about the causal relations between things 
like your blood pressure and your well-being. Similarly, if you are hungry, you need 
food, not because of any logical relationship between statements about these things, 
but because your body lacks food and is telling you to get some. ‘The force of the 
ought’ here comes from the causal processes. We could not survive, let alone flourish 
 13 
if we did not regularly derive conclusions about what’s good and bad, and what we 
should do, from our observations of states of affairs. Those judgements are fallible of 
course, but then so too are simple factual claims. 
 
Values and universalism 
As I noted earlier, conventionalist views of values are common in social science 
because it is particularly clear in such research that values vary significantly between 
different societies, and that different ways of life are associated with different value-
systems and define well-being in different ways. Such a realisation does not fit easily 
with claims that we can resolve value disputes by reference to a common set of 
characteristics constituting human well-being, for this might be taken to presuppose a 
common, universal human nature and to ignore cultural variation. On the other hand, 
it has to be accepted that, as Mary Midgley says, “you can’t have a plant or an animal 
without certain quite definite things being good and bad for it” (Midgley, 2003, p. 
54), and in everyday life it’s important to be able to distinguish these with some 
degree of success just to survive. Yet some may still object that we don’t know what 
well-being is, for we are always judging this from a limited perspective in human 
culture and history.  
We need to steer a course between a universalism that ignores cultural difference and 
a conventionalism that implies that the collective wishful thinking of any culture can 
make any practice good and enable flourishing. The first step is to recognize that our 
remarkable capacity for cultural variation implies that we have something in common, 
which things like insects or rocks don’t have. For example, regardless of where it was 
born, a baby can be taught any of the world’s thousands of the languages; a child born 
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to English parents in London that was immediately given to Japanese parents in 
Tokyo would learn Japanese as easily as Japanese-born children do. So babies must 
have similar capacities in order to be able to become so different. To be sure, children 
vary in their linguistic abilities, just as in their physiques, but they have important 
similarities without which acculturation could not be explained. Further, the fact that 
particular cultural practices have similar affects on groups of people exposed to them 
suggests the latter share similar capacities and susceptibilities. 
The second step is to acknowledge that we have ‘differently-cultivated natures’, 
which have adjusted to particular ways of life that produce certain common patterns 
of wants and needs, and corresponding sources of flourishing and suffering. Thus, 
someone deeply religious may be harmed if they are prevented from praying, whereas 
for an atheist, compulsory religious observance is a form of oppression. Different 
cultures provide both different ways of life and different interpretations of life and 
what is good or bad. But while they may enable different kinds of flourishing, not just 
any cultural practice enables well-being: some things like foot-binding or child abuse 
or eating junk food cause damage regardless of whether a particular culture believes 
them to be good. And given the fallibility of our present knowledge and the 
possibility of new forms of society, there may be forms of well-being that we have yet 
to discover. But this doesn’t mean we know nothing about human well-being – we 
must beware of the all-or-nothing fallacy, that unless we know everything about 
something, we know nothing. We know that we need food and shelter, that children 
need love and security to be able to become confident social actors, that workers need 
time for their bodies to recover, that freedom from the threat of violence is important 
for well-being, that a degree of autonomy is important for human dignity, and so on. 
It would be fatuous to deny such things.  
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In other words, in accordance with the capability approach, there are certain things 
(capabilities) – beings and doings - that we must have the freedom to do if we are to 
flourish (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000). The way in which these capabilities are 
understood and provided may differ between cultures, but they have something in 
common. Thus, the need for recognition and respect can be met in different ways in 
different cultures, according to their particular traditions. This, then, is a pluralist and 
objectivist view, in keeping with critical realism, but not a relativist one. It argues that 
there are many forms of well-being, but not that well-being simply depends on one’s 
cultural point of view. 
 
Attending to the specificities of the other 
As we have seen, critical realism sees values as being about something that can exist 
independently of them, and as capable of being more or less true or appropriate for 
those states of affairs. In this respect, it has similarities to both Aristotelianism, which 
holds that, notwithstanding cultural difference, humans have some capacities for 
flourishing and suffering in common. And both of these approaches share with the 
feminist ethic of care a conception of good ethical behaviour that involves attending 
to the specificities of the other and the context, rather than simply following rules or 
norms to the letter regardless of the details of a particular case (Kittay, 1999; Tronto, 
1994). For these three approaches, rules are at best ‘guidelines’ that may work in 
many common situations, but have to be adjusted appropriately to take account of 
difference.  Andrew Collier, a critical realist, argues that the role of rules in ethics is 
limited to obvious things such as prohibitions on torture and murder: 
“The main body of ethics cannot be formulated in such rules, but will consist 
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in recognising the complexity and specificity of every human being . . . Moral 
codes which consist of do-s and don’t-s serve mainly to excuse their adherents 
from thinking about how they should treat this particular being in this 
particular situation. (Collier, 1999, p. 91.) 
Good carers or social workers, like skilled surgeons, are distinguished by their ability 
to deal sensitively with difference. Rules and prescribed procedures may be helpful to 
novices for beginning to learn how to be a nurse, social worker or surgeon, but they 
soon learn more through practice than by following rules. Experts tend not to follow 
them, and indeed doing so might impede them and result in less efficient and poorer 
quality work. Although it’s also possible for experienced practitioners to become 
complacent and make mistakes, the tendency of management of professionals to 
respond by making them follow formal procedures to the letter can be 
counterproductive.  
Paradoxically, on this view, critical realists like Collier and Sayer (2011)8 argue that 
‘norms’ should not be seen as the essence of normativity, though in some social 
practices they may be given absolute status. At best they codify common moral 
responses that have been tried out and validated publicly as forms of wisdom. But as 
Collier says, precisely because slavish norm-following can become a substitute for 
attending to the situation in hand, this is risky.  
 
Care and Dignity 
                                                             
8 Critical realists are not unique in demoting norms in ethics (e.g. Dancy, 2004), and one prominent 
critical realist – Dave Elder-Vass - gives norms considerable prominence (Elder-Vass, 2012).  
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Attending ethically to the specificities of the other involves protecting their dignity. 
This matters hugely to people. Though they may take it for granted if their dignity is 
respected, if it is not, they are likely to be deeply troubled. Dignity is commonly 
invoked both in declarations of human rights and by oppressed groups appealing for 
support, but it is rarely defined. Recently though, certain professional bodies have 
become more aware of its importance, for their work involves intervention in others’ 
lives in the context of a power-differential between practitioner and client. Unless this 
is handled sensitively it can undermine clients’ dignity. Consequently, there have 
recently been attempts to specify what dignity involves in the spheres of life they 
represent.9 
Most commonly, dignity is associated with the idea of individuals having autonomy 
in the sense of self-command, and hence as having their own goals or ends that need 
to be respected by others. Our dignity is denied us if others use us wholly as means to 
their ends. And we cannot have dignity if no one listens to us and takes what we say 
seriously.  To have dignity we must be allowed to act according to our own will and 
reasoning, provided we take due consideration of others’ dignity. But as the latter 
qualification implies, this autonomy is not unlimited or reducible to simple 
independence. We are social beings, in varying degrees and ways dependent on each 
other. To respect someone’s dignity is also to trust them to use their autonomy in a 
way that takes account of others, and their dignity. It includes trusting them to take on 
responsibilities competently and in good faith. Those who are not trusted or act in 
ways which betray trust lack dignity.  
                                                             
9 Social Care Institute for Excellence, 2013; Shotton and Seedhouse, 1998. Trade Unions have also 
begun to put dignity on their agendas and to define what it means. See, for example, Unison trade 
union’s Dignity at Work campaign in the UK, and The Workplace Dignity Institute in South Africa 
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Dignity is also commonly associated with competence – with having capacities and 
being able to act effectively. But an implication of this is that our dignity is threatened 
if we lose some of the capacities that we once had, particularly if they are normally 
associated with flourishing. For example, someone who has lost their hearing or 
become incontinent may feel their dignity is threatened, especially if others either fail 
to take appropriate account of this or take advantage of their vulnerability. Dignity is 
therefore not only about autonomy and capacities, but vulnerabilities. Good care is 
sensitive to both capacities and vulnerabilities, and treats the patient in ways that 
gives recognition to the former without drawing undue attention to the latter.  
Above all, respecting and supporting someone’s dignity involves recognizing them as 
a whole person, with a history, achievements, needs, concerns, commitments and 
relationships to others that matter to them, and being attentive to their words and 
feelings. Care or other work with people that disregards all this and reduces clients to 
a set of characteristics that a professional unilaterally decides need to be dealt with, 
undermines their dignity. 
While it is common, particularly in liberal societies to talk of dignity as a given 
quality of individuals, the above considerations show that it is relational – dependent 
on interactions with others. As such it is fragile: it is a basic need whose fulfilment 
depends on the kind of relationships people have to others, may or may not be 
realised, rather than something that is simply already realised in everyone regardless 
of this. 
 
Post-structuralism’s misunderstandings of normativity 
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Much of the above is at odds with the understandings of values, normativity and 
human social being that are dominant in social science in the tradition of Foucault. 
While he was renowned for being a tireless political activist, campaigning against 
various forms of oppression, as an academic Foucault refused to evaluate the practices 
he studied, and his writings are notably devoid of thick ethical concepts. Although he 
compellingly demonstrated how power or power/knowledge constructs as well as 
constrains, and can produce pleasure, he refused to distinguish between benign and 
harmful forms of construction or constraint: democracy therefore appears no better 
than dictatorship. His accounts generally have an ominous tone, yet they fail to 
indicate what, if anything, is problematic in the practices he studied. Hence, some 
authors have criticized his work for being ‘crypto-normative’ (Fraser, 1989; 
Habermas, 1990). But it is also crypto-descriptive, for if an account of social life 
doesn’t at least implicitly indicate whether there is flourishing or suffering and 
injustice, it doesn’t tell us very much.  
Not surprisingly he was often questioned about this. As he put it on one occasion:   
“The role of an intellectual is not to tell others what they have to do. By what 
right would he do so? The work of the intellectual is not to shape others’ 
political will: it is, through the analyses that he carried out in his own field, to 
question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb 
people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things.” Foucault (1997, 
p.131). 
It is clear from this and from elsewhere that Foucault (mis)understood normativity as 
a matter of ‘oughts’; like positivists arguing about values in social science via the is-
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ought relation, he reduced normativity to imperatives and ignored the more important 
and prior part - evaluation.  
In post-structuralism, including queer theory, normativity is associated with 
normalising, particularly because the latter imposes identity categories that have the 
effect of suppressing difference, for example, marginalizing and stigmatising inter-sex 
people. But instead of resisting the prior reduction of normativity to norms, or 
challenging just those forms of normalising that have unfair effects, normativity in 
general is condemned on this ground and rejected. Yet of course, this is contradictory 
for being against normativity is itself a normative stance. Life is normative in the 
sense of continually requiring evaluation and judgements about how to act. It’s 
inescapable. To be against sexism, homophobia and racism is to be normative. And 
some ‘abnormal’ behaviours, such as child abuse, are indeed harmful: not all 
differences are good, and hence not all normalising is problematic. Regardless of 
whether behaviours are normal or abnormal in the sense of common or uncommon, 
we have to assess them in terms of their implications for justice and well-being. But 
then, as we have argued, norms should not be the heart of ethics: again, we need to 
attend to the other, their needs, susceptibilities and capacities, and their situation.  
But there are deeper obstacles to understanding normativity in post-structuralism, 
which lie in its social ontology and its non-realist tendencies. In reacting against the 
straw ‘humanist’ figure of the individual as an independent, sovereign, coherent, 
unified agent responding to an external world as it freely chooses, post-structuralism 
gives us a demeaning view of ‘subjects’ as wholly the product of social forces - not 
just constrained and enabled by them, but constituted by them. Even where subjects 
engage in ‘care of the self’, they do so in ways which overwhelmingly involve 
conforming with wider ‘force-relations’, discourse, or ‘power/knowledge’. 
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In part, this is right: we are indeed constituted through our interactions with the wider 
world, from the moment of conception to our deaths. And post-structuralism has 
usefully drawn attention to the importance of the ‘micro-physics’ of power in 
everyday life in shaping who we are and what we do. But at every moment, our 
susceptibility to these interactions or forces depends on the powers of our mind-
bodies, as these have so far co-evolved. And these powers go beyond physiological 
and psychological limits to include reflexivity – the ability to consider ourselves in 
relation to our social contexts, and vice versa (Archer, 2007). We do not have to flip 
from the caricature of the sovereign reasoner to the cultural dope, whether the latter 
appears in traditional sociological guise, or in post-structuralist form. We do not 
simply submit equally to any kind of treatment, regardless of its relation to us or what 
we think about it: some influences may get below our radar, but others can be 
resisted, welcomed or redirected according to how they fit with our bodies and our 
dispositions, beliefs, commitments and concerns.  
Morality and ethics are not reducible to internalizedconventions or norms, and they 
can challenge the latter. As Michael Walzer puts it:  
“The moral world and the social world are more or less coherent, but they are 
never more than more or less coherent. Morality is always potentially 
subversive of class and power.” (Walzer, 1989, p.22). 
Our moral sentiments are not just products of prevailing forms of power, but are the 
co-products of our mind-bodies, our physiology – for example, the mirror neurons 
which enable empathy – and our capacities to feel and think, as these have been 
influenced by, and have engaged with, our culture. All of these are co-products of 
social, biological and physical interactions. As Kate Soper comments:  
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“ . . . the body is neither simply the effect of discourse nor simply a point of 
‘brute’ resistance to it, but a centre of experience which is actively involved in 
the construction of discourse itself” . . . “Instinct and feeling, both physical 
and emotional, everywhere intrude to influence what is said – just as the 
things which come to be said intrude back upon feeling.” (Soper, 1990, p.11).   
It is one thing to reject the idea that we are sovereign individual subjects, guided by 
reason, coherent and internally unified, somehow already constituted prior to 
socialization; it is quite another to reduce people to ciphers, faceless ‘subjects’ or 
‘bodies’, objects of a superior yet curiously unreflexive academic gaze.  
Finally, post-structuralism’s difficulties with normativity are underpinned by its 
overly-strong form of social constructionism which assumes that discourses produce 
what they name, unilaterally and successfully, as if collective wishful thinking – 
‘regimes of truth’ - always worked. But while discourses can sometimes do this to 
some degree, there are invariably resistances, intractable objects and unintended 
consequences, and simply many other things going on. Thus a child who is taken into 
care by social workers may come to understand herself in the terms used by social 
workers and adopt an identity in foster care as a ‘looked after child’ (in the UK), and 
this may influence her behaviour, yet this does not simply replace the many other 
aspects of her identity and ways of thinking about them but exists in tension with 
them (Denenberg, 2016). Discourses as ways of thinking embedded and enacted in 
practices and institutions produce real effects, but like any knowledge, discourses are 
fallible; as critical realism insists, the world is not reducible to our knowledge of it, 




I have been proposing a view of normativity not in terms of norms and imperatives or 
free-floating values, but as an ongoing process in the flow of life through which we 
monitor and evaluate things in relation to needs, wants, commitments and concerns, 
or  more generally in relation to well-being. The verbal expression of these 
evaluations usually involves thick ethical concepts that defy any fact-value 
dichotomy. But this dichotomy is deeply ingrained in modernity, as part of a family of 
such hierarchical oppositions: objective/subjective, mind/body, reason/emotion, 
science/ethics. Thus, emotions are seen not as intelligent responses to the world but as 
irrational and unreasonable. In social science there has been an attempt to expel 
values from science and reason, and while there have been radical challenges to this, 
these often leave the dichotomy intact as we saw. What is less noticed is the 
attempted expulsion of reason from values, and it is this in particular that we need to 
challenge. One important reason why social science is poor at recognizing this is that 
the dichotomies have become an organizing principle of the division of academic 
knowledge as it has developed over the last 150 years, so that normative thinking has 
become ghettoized in philosophy and political theory, while the other disciplines 
assume that they can and should disregard it (Sayer, 2000b). The work of 
professionals like social workers is inescapably normative, but so too is life in 
general. Directly or indirectly, our evaluative judgements are related to well-being, 
including matters of fairness and justice. In turn, well-being is constrained and 
enabled by our differently-cultivated natures, by the kind of beings we have become. 
Whether to understand society, or to intervene in it as professionals, or just to live 
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